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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL J. MIDDLESTADT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah; MOUNTAIN FUEL 
SUPPLY; CONTINENTAL CASUALTY; 
COMTROL INC.; WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH; and EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the filing limitations found in Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 violate the open court 
provision of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 
arbitrarily impose time limitations for filing claims for 
workers' compensation benefits in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
This court must apply a correction of error standard 
giving no deference to the Industrial Commission's 
interpretation of the law. Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-46b-
16(4)(d) and 63-46b-16(4)(a) Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 
Case No. 920237-CA 
Priority No. 7 
P.2d 123/ 125 (Utah App. 1992) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The applicable versions of Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-
65 and 35-1-66 and Article 1/ Section 11 and Article 1/ 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution are set forth verbatim in 
the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This is an action wherein the petitioner is seeking 
judicial review of the March 12/ 1992/ Industrial Commission 
Order Denying Motion for Review. R. 54-57 
Course of Proceedings: 
On May 21/ 1991/ petitioner filed an application for 
hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah seeking/ among 
other things/ additional temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability benefits. R. 11 
Following an attorney conference/ which was scheduled on 
November 19/ 1991/ at the request of respondent's counsel/ 
the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order of Dismissal. 
R. 15/ 38 
On December 17/ 1991/ petitioner filed his motion for 
review with the Industrial Commission. R. 41-45 That motion 
was denied and the order of dismissal was affirmed on March 
12, 1992. R. 54-57 
Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Review with 
this court on April 10/ 1992. R. 59 This court issued such 
writ on April 10/ 1992. R. 61 
Disposition by the Industrial Commission: 
On March 12/ 1992/ the Industrial Commission affirmed 
the Order of Dismissal of the Administrative Law Judge by 
concluding that the petitioner's claims are barred by Utah 
Code Ann. 35-1-65 and 35-1-66. R. 54-57 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Petitioner/ hereinafter "Mr. Middlestadt" / was 
injured in industrial accidents on August 16/ 1976/ and 
December 5, 1980. R. 4/ 8/ 18/ 26/ 
2. On April 2/ 1985/ following an evidentiary hearing 
and the issuance of a medical panel report/ the 
Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact/ 
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding Mr. Middlestadt/ among 
other things/ temporary disability benefits and permanent 
partial disability benefits as a result of the August 16/ 
1976/ and December 5/ 1980/ industrial accidents. R. 3-10 
3. The respondents have paid Mr. Middlestadt benefits 
pursuant to the April 2, 1985/ Order. R. 11, 27 
4. Mr. Middlestadt had back surgeries on or about 
November 16/ 1987/ and October 24/ 1990. These surgeries are 
secondary to the original industrial injury of August 16/ 
1976 and December 5/ 1980. R. 35/ 141 
5. On May 21/ 1991/ Mr. Middlestadt filed an 
Application for Hearing seeking, among other things/ 
additional temporary total and permanent partial disability 
benefits for the injuries he sustained in the August 16/ 
1976/ and December 5/ 1980/ industrial accidents. R. 11 
6. Following a November 19/ 1991/ attorney conference 
[R. 32]/ which conference was requested by counsel for 
respondents [R. 15]/ the Administrative Law Judge entered an 
Order of Dismissal on November 21/ 1991. R. 38 
7. The Administrative Law Judge entered his Order of 
Dismissal of his own volition/ without motion by respondents 
and without entering any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. R. 38 
8. The only medical evidence before the Industrial 
Commission supports Mr. Middlestadt's claims. Dr. J. Lynn 
Smith has indicated that Mr. Middlestadt's November 16/ 1987/ 
and October 24/ 1990/ surgeries "are secondary to" the August 
16/ 1976/ and December 5/ 1980/ industrial accidents. R. 141 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The critical issue to be resolved by this court is very 
simple. Can an injured worker file for additional workers' 
compensation benefits when the claim for such benefits does 
not accrue until after the running of certain filing 
limitations? 
Mr. Middlestadt could not file for the additional 
workers' compensation benefits until he had surgeries in 
November 1987 and October 1990. Until he needed those 
surgeries to treat the injuries he sustained in the August 
16/ 1976 and December 5/ 1990/ industrial accidents he had no 
claim for additional workers' compensation benefits. 
To affirm the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits 
is not just unfair and unjust/ it is absurd. Under the 
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Hence/ when Mr. Middlestadt sustained his injuries on 
August 16/ 1976/ and December 5/ 1980/ the only remedy 
available to him was seeking relief through the Industrial 
Commission under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Utah Constitution Article 1/ Section 11 states: 
"All court shall be open/ and every person/ for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation/ shall have remedy by due course of law/ 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State/ by himself or counsel/ any civil 
cause to which he is a party." [Emphasis added] 
The clear language of that section guarantees access to 
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness 
and equality. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp./ 717 P.2d 670/ 
675 (Utah 1985) In the Berry case the Utah Supreme Court 
made a thoughtful and detailed analysis of Article 1/ Section 
11 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 674-681 The Court 
recognized that that section "is an extension of the due 
process clause [Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution]." Id. at 679. 
The Utah Supreme Court then adopted a two-part analysis 
which must be applied in determining whether a statute 
violates Article 1/ Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
First/ does the questionable statute provide the 
"injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy by due course of law for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in value or other 
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
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Under the second prong of the Berry test/ said sections 
must be to eliminate a clear social or economic evil and must 
not be an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. Id. 
What possible social or economic evil is eliminated when 
an injured worker/ who has been found to be entitled to 
benefits/ is denied further benefits under the Workers' 
Compensation Act? 
On April 2/ 1985/ an administrative law judge ruled that 
Mr. Middlestadt was in fact entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits for the injuries he sustained as a result of the 
accidents on August 16/ 1976/ and December 5/ 1980. R. 8. 
The Workers' Compensation Act is social legislation to 
financially help workers who are injured while performing 
their job/ and their families. One of the primary underlying 
purposes for this legislation was to assure prompt medical 
help for the injured workers and financial help for the 
injured workers and their families. "The strong public 
interest in compensating employees and their dependents and 
encouraging safety precautions in the work place is reflected 
in the well-established practice of construing compensation 
statutes liberally in favor or recovery. _Td at 128/ citing 
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund/ 796 P.2d 676/ 679 (Utah 1990). 
1 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-1-65 provides/ in part/ that an 
injured worker is entitled to temporary total disability 
compensation. That section further provides "[i]n no case 
1. The Code sections quoted herein are those applicable at 
the time of Mr. Middlestadt's industrial accidents. 
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675 (Utah 1985) 
A statute of repose prevents suit a statutorily 
specified number of years after a particular event occurs/ 
without regard to when the cause of action accrues. A 
statute of limitations precludes suit a statutorily 
specified number of years after a cause of action accrues. 
Velarde v. Board of Review/ 831 P.2d 123/ 125 (Utah App. 
1992). 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 attempt to 
limit the award of temporary total disability and permanent 
partial disability benefits to "eight years after the date of 
the injury." In other words/ a specified number of years 
after the event occurs. However/ Mr. Middlestadt's claim did 
did not accrue until November 16/ 1987/ and October 24/ 1990. 
R. 11 
This issue was also resolved by this court in Wrolstad 
v. Industrial Commission/ 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990). In 
Wrolstad the petitioner filed a claim under the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law. This court stated that 
"[a] person cannot file an occupational disease claim for a 
disease that he does not know he has." Id. at 245 This 
court then found that the applicable statute in that case 
violated Article 1/ Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
because the Legislature provided no alternative remedy. Id. 
If this court adopts the conclusion reached by the 
Industrial Commission in this case/ then every worker who is 
injured on the job must file an application for hearing 
within the specified time limits regardless of whether the 
worker; has a claim foi: benefits i'\ worker who waitr; to fill. <j 
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tne statute runs from the ace, Jen" / \i Larson / 
Workmen's Compensation Law, Section "7^K-^ ' i'- ^r*-'-
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genera. ~ ant . a period ;ai.:i when it begins to 
run before a claim exists cic .is^cmes : , destroy it 
before it is born? is it au, elementary that the 
r;r:nii-. : ': :::^  perijd m«,3t be related to the tine of 
acquisition of the enforceable rig ither than to 
some event which may or may net coincide with m a t 
acquis .** ic "' :oppose a statute were pcissed whir'' —^ \ 
that/ in the event of any highway collision/ suit must 
be commenced within two years of the last presidential 
election. This is in no way any sillier or more 
oppressive than a statute which says that a man who gets 
a bit of grime in his eye in 1960 which causes only 
slight irritation must bring a claim for blindness 
within one year of that time—blindness that does not 
develop until 1962." 2B Larson/ Workmen's Compensation 
Law, Section 78.42(e) (1989) 
Point II 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 
arbitrarily impose time limitations for filing 
claims for workers' compensation benefits in 
violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Article 1/ Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that lf[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." See Malan v. Lewis/ 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 takes away 
an injured workers' rights to benefits simply because his or 
her right does not accrue until the running of some arbitrary 
time limit following the date of the accident. Whereas a 
worker who is totally disabled is not subject to any time 
limits to file a claim for such benefits. This/ on its face 
is not a uniform operation. 
All Mr. Middlestadt is asking for is a procedure that is 
based on fairness and equality. This court has an 
opportunity to give him, and other injured workers/ such a 
procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons Mr. Middlestadt requests 
that this court find that the time limits in Sections 65 and 
66 violate the open court provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore/ this court should remand this matter to the 
Industrial Commission for the purpose of awarding Mr. 
Middlestadt the benefits to which he is entitled. 
Dated this 13th day of October/ 1992. 
H an sOf^Stfh e f f 1 ei 
Attorney foj^ftfC Middlestadt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of October 1992/ 
four copies of the foregoing were delivered to the following: 
Theodore Kanell 
4 Triad Center/ Suite 500 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84110 
Richard Sumsion 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111 
Benjamin Sims 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84111 
Erie V. Boorman 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84111 
Dated this 13th day of October/ 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Constitution Article I, Sections 11 and 24 
2. U.C.A. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 
l/i 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
35-1-65. Temporary disability—Amount of payments—State average 
weekly wage defined.—(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 662,4% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury 
so long as such disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and 
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to 
a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks 
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
(2) * * * [Same as parent volume]. 
35-1-66. Partial disability—Scale of payments.—Where the injury 
causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such 
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight 
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66 2/3% of the 
difference between that employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, 
but not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week and in addition thereto $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week. 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at 
any time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee 
whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed 
and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application 
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, 
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of 
compensation. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, 
or the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 2/3% 
of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but 
not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per 
week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
minor children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number 
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition 
to the compensation hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability, 
to wit: 
(A) to (C) • • • [Same as parent volume.] 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and 
paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in 
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps) 
using pure tone air eon&aetion audiomettic instruments (ASA. 1951) ap-
proved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of 
hearing impairment. Eeduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 
2000 cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable 
disability. 
